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The Christian revival is among one of the most re-markable social and cultural changes occurring inChina in the post-Mao era. Considered a deep so-
cial stigma closely linked to Western imperialism and colo-
nialism half a century ago, Christianity is now increasingly
regarded as modern, fashionable, and even coveted among
China’s urban population, especially the younger genera-
tion. (1) Chinese Christians not only hold worship services,
prayer meetings, Bible study sessions, Sunday schools, and
choir rehearsals but are also actively engaged in the market
economy and contributed to the post-Mao modernisation. (2)
While the party-state still sets the parameters within which
Christians can pursue and promote their faith in the broader
society, Christianity, in both popular and official discourse,
has been increasingly recognised as a legitimate participant
of Chinese modernity and a positive moral force “benefiting
a spiritually hungry population that is growing more ‘individ-
ualistic.’” (3)
Western discourse on Chinese Christianity has been domi-
nated by sensational journalistic accounts of state religious
persecution on the one hand, and speculative demographic
assessments on the Christian proportion of society on the
other. While China historians have contributed a great deal
to the understanding of Chinese Christianity today, few so-
cial scientists have engaged in fieldwork-based research on
contemporary Chinese Christianity and its changing dynam-
ics. (4) Christianity in post-Mao China has been popularly
perceived as an alternative reality for people who are spiri-
tual needy and politically disillusioned — an explanation that
is too abstract to have any scholarly significance. (5) This
paper aims to provide an empirically-grounded, drastically
different picture, in which the religiosity of Chinese Protes-
tant Christians is not so much related to acts of spiritual
seeking in a state-centred political framework as it is shaped
by desires and practices of self-making among neoliberal in-
dividuals under rapid marketisation.
My analysis explores this Protestant project of self-making
with a focus on the quality (suzhi) discourse among the
urban-oriented church community. Suzhi is a keyword in
contemporary Chinese life and has structured a wide range
of post-Mao socio-political practices. (6) In particular, it has
become an overarching term that marks one’s sense of self-
worth and value in the market economy, and the governing
elite views raising the suzhi of China’s vast population as
vital to the country’s overall competitiveness in the era of
global capitalism. (7) Likewise, as I argue below, the emerg-
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The paper addresses the changing dynamics of Protestantism in contemporary urban China through the lens of the
Christian discourse of quality (suzhi). Linking suzhi with processes of identity and subject formation in the Chinese
Protestant community, the paper shows that the religiosity of today’s Chinese Protestants is not so much related to
acts of spiritual seeking in a state-centred political framework as it is shaped by desires and practices of self-making
among neoliberal individuals under rapid marketisation. It also demonstrates that Chinese Protestantism has
undergone not just a quantitative increase but also a qualitative change that counters the one-dimensional
representation of Christian religiosity in the post-Mao era. 
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ing Christian discourse of suzhi articulates a sense of urban
elite subjectivity and becomes central to the development of
the Chinese church in the context of a highly commer-
cialised economy. 
To make this point, I have structured the article as follows. I
shall first explore the socio-political context in which the
Christian discourse of suzhi is made possible, especially in
comparison to the resurgence of Chinese popular religion
that has been labelled as superstition by both modernist Chi-
nese states and Christian orthodoxy for most of the twenti-
eth century. Then I shall explore the suzhi discourse in the
post-Mao context of Protestant revival in Wenzhou, one of
China’s most advanced regional economies. I shall use this
case to illustrate how the Christian discourse of suzhi in-
volves simultaneously an expression of elite status in religious
terms and the cultural and political use of social power to
construct an urban religious identity. This discursive produc-
tion of identity constitutes a core cultural mechanism of
Protestant development in economically advanced urban
areas that is distinctively different from that in the economi-
cally stagnant rural inland, e.g. Henan Province (known as
the Bethlehem of China). Although I lack the space to make
a comparative case here, I hope the effort will suggest some
new directions in the thinking on this understudied topic. Contextuali sing  the  Chr ist iandiscourse  o f  suzhi
The suzhi discourse is a direct outgrowth of the state pro-
gram of population control and governance. (8) Since the in-
troduction of the one-child policy in the early 1980s, the
Chinese government has focused its efforts on reducing the
quantity and raising the quality of the population (renkou
suzhi). Driven by anxieties over the low suzhi of the Chi-
nese people and the nation’s quest for its rightful place in the
world, population quality became a key concern for both the
party-state and the general public in the 1990s. Under this
context, the state project of raising the quality of the popu-
lation has discursively associated everything that seems to
impede China’s modernisation with low suzhi and backward-
ness. Popular religion has been a main target of attack. Ann
Anagnost notes the following:
As the reform decade of the 1980s continued, feudal
superstition continued as a potent sign of backward-
ness and, at times, depending on the larger political
context, as a powerful marker of social disorder as
well. As a sign of backwardness it became caught up
in the late 1980s with the project of raising the qual-
ity of the people (tigao renminde suzhi). This project
extends far beyond a directly eugenics discourse to
encompass issues of education and the inculcation of
the masses with the requirements of good citizenship.
For instance, engaging in popular religious practice
would disqualify a peasant household from attaining
any of the status markers that designate model house-
holds, such as the civilized household (wenminghu)
or the Five-Good Family (wuhao jiating (9)).
There are only five officially-sanctioned religions in China
today: Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism, Catholicism, and
Islam. Theoretically illegal, folk or popular religious practices
have nevertheless flourished in the Reform Era. (10) The only
viable means for popular religious temples to attain legiti-
macy seems to be refashioning themselves as Daoist or Bud-
dhist organisations. (11) The assertion of state presence, in the
form of either cultural discourse or institutional arrangement,
has accompanied the revival of popular religion. As detailed
in Adam Chau’s research on a popular religious temple in
Shaanbei, local religious elites actively channel local re-
sources upward to various local state agencies in exchange
for official recognition and protection of their illegal activi-
ties, while the local state profits by channelling legitimacy
downward. (12) According to Chau, in this “channelling
zone,” properties of popular religion are considered new
sources of revenue by local state agencies and have become
a power base for local officials to pursue their growing per-
sonal greed and vanity. While these “superstitious” elements
of religion have revived in rural China, it should be made
clear that, for popular religious activists, this politics of legit-
imation is a consequence of their illegality and stigmatisation
in broader society. Throughout the process of legitimation
politics the essentialist state category of superstition imposed
on popular religion is not unsettled but reinforced and per-
petuated. In this sense, this channelling process is simultane-
ously a process of illegalisation of popular religion. 
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The social stigma and illegality attached to popular religion
contrasts sharply with a sense of cultural legitimacy and su-
periority associated with Christianity in today’s China.
Protestant Christianity, assuming and embodying a funda-
mental distinction between religion and superstition, can be
conveniently tied in with the state project of raising the qual-
ity of the people, especially in resisting evil cults and hetero-
doxy and fending off the impact of popular religion. In her
study of rural Wenzhou’s ritual communities, Mayfair Yang
observes that local officials generally hold a favourable atti-
tude towards Christianity due to its connections with the
modern West and its differentiation from popular religion. (13)
She quotes one Wenzhou township official saying:
It is different with Christianity, which respects sci-
ence, and science is even an outgrowth of Christian-
ity. It’s different with our own religion. It’s backward
and teaches people to believe in superstitions, magic,
and devils. It tells people that this and that is bad luck.
And, religion is used by people as a pretext for mak-
ing money (pianqian). It’s this bad segment of reli-
gion that we have to attack. (14)
Although unregistered Christian churches continue to face
local official opposition and excessive policing in the Reform
Era for a variety of reasons (some are clearly not on religious
grounds), Christianity has assumed a moral high ground in
many urban localities due to its emphasis on spiritual ideol-
ogy and ethical principles. The Christian rhetoric of morality
is often very forceful in celebrating the ultimate, transcendent
good. By containing such binary concepts as saved or un-
saved, belief or unbelief, good or evil, heaven or hell, it incor-
porates a language of dominance and power. Furthermore,
there is little appreciation for the culture of merit-making that
is central to Buddhism. As Richard Madsen points out, in
contrast to Christian philosophy that absolutises the notion of
goodness (as a quality identified with God), there is no clear
distinction between good and evil in either the Confucian tra-
dition or the Daoist classics. (15) The distinction has been pro-
foundly blurred by the Chinese emphasis on li or ritual and
social propriety. (16) While goodness is key to achieving good
karma for Buddhists, it is not perceived as an ultimate goal. (17)
The forceful Christian moral rhetoric lends tremendous
power to the self-justification of Christian identity. For many,
Christians and non-Christians alike, being Christian means
being good. Along this line of reasoning, one’s Christian
identity will be challenged if certain moral standards are not
met. The Christian sense of moral superiority can be traced
back to the late nineteen and early twentieth centuries, when
the Puritanical Christianity was brought into China by West-
ern missionaries. Protestant belief played an important and
visible part in the making of Chinese citizenship and the re-
form of immoral social practices such as gambling, opium-
smoking, concubinage, child-brides, and prostitution in the
early Republican period. (18) Nowadays Christianity is known
as a religion that promotes family harmony, and Christians
claim a disproportionately high number of “model workers“
and low crime rates in their midst. (19) The officially-recog-
nised church has made morality (e.g. honesty, obedience,
and restraint) a central theme of sermons and publications,
in accordance with its effort to adapt to socialist morality. (20)
Increasingly, Christianity has become an officially recog-
nised source of public morality to complement the state’s vi-
sion of morality and contribute to social harmony, especially
given the prevalence of corruption and inequality in society.
Its legitimacy and cultural superiority are further reinforced
in the party-state’s anti-“evil cult” discourse, which has taken
shape since the crackdown on Falun Gong in the late
1990s. (21) In contrast, popular religion, with its emphasis on
the materiality of ritual practices, is unlikely to participate in
the elite discourse of morality or in the construction of iden-
tity communities based on a shared moral language. In do-
mestic Chinese scholarly discourse popular religion has even
been blamed for impeding Christianity’s development and
tainting its image in rural China by making Christianity
“low-class, vulgar, and backward” (diji cusu luohou) and un-
likely to contribute to China’s modernisation. (22) During var-
ious anti-superstition campaigns, popular religion was la-
belled as an evil element in the ideological realm and an un-
productive social force. State displacement of popular reli-
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gious and ritual practices not only formed an integral part of
the violent political campaigns of the Maoist era but has con-
tinued in the post-Mao modernisation process. (23)
In an important sense the moral and economic agency of the
party-state parallels the self-claimed superiority of urban Protes-
tantism. Both place popular religious and ritual activities in the
antithetic position of futility and backwardness as a way of con-
structing their own legitimacy. This resemblance is reminiscent
of the relationship of Western missionaries in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries and the Han Chinese socialist
state, both of which celebrated the spirit of Puritanism and rep-
resented themselves as a civilising force against China’s ethnic
minorities. (24) This parallel relationship allows Chinese Protes-
tantism to borrow the legitimacy of state discourse to promote
its place in Chinese modernity. However, this is also a con-
tested process in which the state attempts to remake individual
subjects and local communities while Chinese believers seek to
engage the state on their own terms. 
There have been discussions on how to raise the suzhi of
preachers, other clergy, lay believers, and even choir conduc-
tors in Tianfeng (Heavenly Wind), the official Protestant bi-
monthly magazine published in cosmopolitan Shanghai and
the mouthpiece of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. De-
spite their diverse approaches, the urban religious sophisti-
cates all hold the view that as the number of Chinese believ-
ers increases, the church ought to be more concerned with
the “quality of belief” (xinyang suzhi). One essay entitled
“comments on the quality of belief” defines it as a combina-
tion of a believer’s confidence in God’s plan and his/her be-
haviour and as an overall judgment of a believer’s under-
standing and practice of Christian truth. (25) The preacher’s
suzhi often is considered key to raising the quality of belief
among the entire church, and can include such qualities as a
neat and solemn appearance, good work and reputation, a
loving heart, serious spiritual pursuit, and cultural knowl-
edge. (26) It is noteworthy that these are all “individually em-
bodied, human qualities” rather than non-human entities. (27)
In Christian terms, suzhi are God-given qualities. The Chris-
tian suzhi discourse thus distinguishes itself from state dis-
course by emphasising divine agency and God-human inter-
action. 
In the circles of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement and
state-approved seminaries, the project of raising the quality
of belief is often juxtaposed with the controversial theologi-
cal reconstruction movement, which emphasises downplay-
ing the doctrine of “justification by faith” and adapting to so-
cialism. (28) As Bishop Ding Guangxun points out, “The
paramount issue (zhong zhong zhi zhong) in the Chinese
church’s work is to strive to raise the overall quality (zhengti
suzhi) of Christians and actively facilitate Christian educa-
tion reform and promote theological reform among the co-
workers.” (29) According to Ding, the underlying logic of the-
ological reform is that “a Christian has to be a good citizen
first; otherwise he/she cannot be a good Christian.” (30) In an
essay entitled “How to Raise the Quality of Belief,” a pas-
tor from the Nanjing Union Theological Seminary (the only
national seminary in China), indicates that the quality of be-
lief has become a central issue with regard to Chinese
Protestant citizenship. As he states:
Raising the quality of belief among lay believers, on
theological and political levels, is to guide the major-
ity of believers to self-consciously bear a duty of citi-
zenship (gongmin zeren), to stick to the principle of
holding loyalty to the motherland and of loving the
people, and to take initiatives to understand and sup-
port the nation’s modernisation enterprise. In other
words, we need to actively guide believers to adapt to
socialist society. In sum, at this stage to raise the quality
of lay believers in the Chinese church is to most effec-
tively explain to the majority of believers the importance
and content of the theological reconstruction work. (31)
With a central concern for the role of Protestantism in the
state discourse on socialist modernisation, the theological re-
construction movement is likely to alienate official church
leadership from the majority of ordinary Protestants at the
local level who tend to insist on an apolitical religious out-
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look. (32) Accordingly, there may be a gap in the interpreta-
tion of what constitutes Christian suzhi between the leading
circles of official Christianity and the many autonomous
churches. However, what is clear is that the state discourse
of suzhi has powerfully informed the Christian suzhi dis-
course, which embodies the transmutation between citizen-
ship and religious practice in the construction of contempo-
rary Chinese Christian identity and subjectivity. (33)
To explicate this discursive process of identity formation, it
is necessary to look at how the term suzhi is used, imagined,
experienced, and made sense of in the local Christian con-
text and at the level of everyday life. To achieve this end, I
shall draw on my fieldwork on urban Protestant communities
in Wenzhou in coastal southeast China. The Wenzhou story
shows how a local Christian discourse on suzhi adds impor-
tant new dynamics in the development and identity of urban
Chinese Protestantism.The  rol e  of  suzhi in  buildingsoc iorel ig ious di st inctions andel ite  Protestant  subj ec tiv ity :The  Wenzhou story
Wenzhou is both a Christian centre and a nationwide model
for developing market capitalism since the 1980s. It is esti-
mated that 10 to 15 percent of the local population
(700,000-1,000,000) is Protestant, and no less than 70 per-
cent of Wenzhou‘s Protestants base their livelihoods on pri-
vate business. (34) The city serves as a prime site for under-
standing the changing dynamics of Chinese Protestantism in
the transitional economy. Although Wenzhou still appears to
be a provincial town in the Reform Era, it is the home of
Chinese merchants who have actively engaged in global
trade for decades. There are many Protestant entrepreneurs
and merchants who are known as “boss Christians” lo-
cally. (35) The success of the “Wenzhou model” of economic
development as a regional model of “socialist market econ-
omy” has demonstrated Wenzhou people’s strong capacity to
engage in modern capitalist production. Accordingly, many
entrepreneur church leaders have self-consciously adopted
neoliberal ideology and agendas for their projects of reli-
gious and cultural self-realisation. (36) They often perceive and
portray themselves as bearing high suzhi, especially in com-
parison with poor, ignorant, superstitious non-Christian peas-
ants, who are characterised as having low suzhi. (37) The
Wenzhou Christian discourse of suzhi thus favours the ex-
pansive aspirations of urban Protestant elites and encom-
passes a language of distinction in everyday life. (38)
From pi ety to qual ity:  A rheto rical  shif t  
Urban-oriented Wenzhou Protestants have internalised the
notion of suzhi and deploy it widely in daily religious rheto-
ric and experience. Once when one of my Christian friends
kindly invited me to her church’s Christmas performance
and banquet to be held in a hotel, she added from the other
side of phone, “Don’t expect too much, the suzhi of our
church is not so good, and they are all middle-aged aunts.”
In this context, the “suzhi of the church” means the suzhi of
the Christians. The low suzhi of the church speaks to the
fact that Chinese Christians have long been viewed as being
mostly old, female, illiterate, or semi-illiterate. (39) However,
this is increasingly no longer the case. 
When I asked local believers to comment on changes that
have taken place in the church community in the past few
58 N o  2 0 0 9 / 4
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An official poster in Wenzhou’s central city district
advocating personal suzhi enhancement.
© Nanlai Cao  
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decades, a common expression used is “the suzhi of the
Wenzhou church has improved.” This expression refers to
the fact that the urban middle class, particularly young and
middle-aged businesspeople and college graduates, have in-
creasingly joined the local church. The tenth anniversary
special church brochure published by a major local church in
2005 states that “under the protection of God and the guid-
ance of the Holy Spirit, the church’s various ministries have
developed smoothly and achieved certain outcomes and ef-
fects: the number of believers is steadily on the increase, and
the quality of belief is also improving. We firmly believe the
church will have a better future.” This statement is represen-
tative of local believers’ view of the post-Mao Protestant re-
vival in which the rise of relatively high suzhi of believers
constitutes one key dimension. 
Nevertheless, this suzhi discourse reveals situations of not
only widespread agreement but also intense contention
within the Wenzhou church. A thoughtful young local
preacher spells out the Christian notion of suzhi in an essay
entitled “The crisis and challenges of today’s Wenzhou
church.” He has frequently travelled to churches and semi-
naries in Hong Kong and led a Wenzhou Christian delega-
tion of about 20 people to visit Hong Kong in 2006. After
briefly describing the scene of a well-ordered Hong Kong
church meeting, he started to reflect on the Wenzhou
church’s lack of a good institutional structure and attributes
this to the problem of suzhi. As he states: 
The problem of suzhi involves spiritual suzhi, moral
suzhi, cultural suzhi, psychological suzhi and so on . . .
a balanced life is a life with suzhi. When most Wen-
zhou preachers, church leaders and believers’ suzhi is
enhanced, the institutional problem will naturally and
gradually be resolved. . . In the past few decades the
Wenzhou church has focused on establishing the
church buildings at the expense of cultivating high
suzhi people with talent and has focused on leaders’
prestige and power consolidation at the expense of cul-
tivating a new generation of church leaders. This will
lead to the complete collapse of the church’s ministries. 
The notion of suzhi forms the basis of his sharp questioning
of the unique model of Wenzhou Christian development that,
according to him, emphasises quantity rather than quality. (40)
Evidently, when local Protestants talk about suzhi, it does not
simply mean one’s spiritual quality, a singular form of suzhi,
but also entrepreneurial capacity, educational qualifications,
morality, and so on. As Andrew Kipnis aptly notes, the term
suzhi can take both singular and plural forms, and the slippage
between the two forms enables hierarchical discourses that re-
quire linking one of the many specific qualities of an individ-
ual to an overall judgment of his/her Quality. (41) By moving
from plural to singular/overall suzhi, the young preacher’s
warning reflects the Wenzhou church’s rising anxiety over its
own status in an increasingly competitive religious environ-
ment, especially in comparison with overseas churches. (42)
Raising the church’s overall suzhi has become an emergent
issue on the agenda of many Wenzhou churches, particularly
those led by forward-looking entrepreneurs. Brother Zhou is
one of those who seek to promote the church’s “cultural mis-
sion.” Once he passionately spoke on his church’s goal:
We should magnify (hongyang) the culture of the
church. I think today’s Christians all have Christian
faith, but this is not enough. They still need to have a
Christian culture. Christian culture has a rather big
effect on promoting church growth and raising the
church’s overall suzhi. Our church not only needs to
fulfill an evangelical mission but also a cultural mis-
sion. This cultural mission means that we need to let
Christ rule in every field, be it science, art, mathemat-
ics, politics, economy, culture, or education. We are
all able to uphold Christ, That is to say, the best sci-
entist is Christian, the best educationist is Christian,
the best writer is Christian, and the best mathemati-
cian is Christian. In any field we all uphold Christ.
This is the cultural mission. 
The term “culture” here has little to do with a way of life in
the anthropological sense, but refers to one’s educational at-
tainment and levels of civility. It is a central part of the suzhi
discourse, as suzhi is often interchangeable with cultural qual-
ity (wenhua suzhi) in daily Chinese rhetoric. As a successful
factory boss, Zhou once even said that “suzhi determines
one’s fate.” The Protestant emphasis on overall suzhi reveals
the church’s increasing focus on social outreach and cultural
engagement with the larger public in order to be “the salt and
light” in society. Many local Protestants, both church leaders
and ordinary members, share the same logic that “as the
church’s suzhi rises, more people will naturally like to join it.”
Wenzhou Protestants’ use of suzhi discourse reveals a two-
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40. For the establishment and expansion of Christian space in post-Mao Wenzhou, see
Nanlai Cao, “Christian Entrepreneurs and the Post-Mao State,” art. cit.
41. Andrew Kipnis, “Suzhi: A Keyword Approach,” art. cit., pp. 303-304.
42. For a portrait of Wenzhou Protestants’ desires and practices of catching up and compet-
ing with their overseas counterparts, see Nanlai Cao, “Boss Christians,” art. cit., pp. 84-85. 
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way process: the secularisation of the religious and the spir-
itualisation of a profoundly secularised local society. Wen-
zhou entrepreneurial values and forms have imposed them-
selves upon the church, but all of this is supposedly in the
service of Christianity, of spreading Wenzhou Christianity.
There is also a tension and sometimes a border drawn be-
tween secular and religious values. This can be seen in peo-
ple’s view of piety and pious believers. 
Compared with the term suzhi that keeps cropping up in
local Protestants’ conversations, I have noticed the relatively
low frequency of the term “piety” (zhongxin) being used by
local believers, even though piety is still often used to evalu-
ate the elder generation of believers who suffered under
Mao. These suffering Christians may receive the title “God’s
pious servants” (shen de zhongxin puren). When piety is
mentioned today, it is always associated with such terms as
“the Cultural Revolution,” “suffering” (shouku), “martyr-
dom” (xundao), and “persecution” (bipo). In particular, the
term “God’s pious servant” most often appear in memorial
speeches recalling how an individual testified to personal
faith by “suffering for Lord” (wei zhu shouku) in the face of
harsh persecution during the Cultural Revolution. Many eld-
erly Wenzhou believers still wholeheartedly embrace state
persecution to testify to the authenticity of their faith. As a
local church leader and retired high school teacher, who was
jailed for two years for his faith during the Cultural Revolu-
tion, commented, “Only persecution can attest to the truth-
fulness of one’s faith, as it is hard to tell who is a real Chris-
tian and who is not.” The Bible verse frequently invoked by
the elderly suffering Christians to express this positive view
of persecution and martyrdom is “Blessed are those who are
persecuted because of righteousness“ (Matthew 5: 11).
In fact, the current church’s concern and pursuit of suzhi un-
derscores a major shift in both its identity and its direction
of development. In light of the current local government’s
lassie-faire attitude towards Christianity, Christian piety
refers not so much to an inner quality that once helped de-
fend personal faith against brutal repression by the Maoist
state but is linked to performed humbleness and self-denun-
ciation in the form of prolonged prayers and weeping during
public worship services. Viewed increasingly as an empty
form that can be performed, cultivated, and even faked,
piety has become devalued.  
Some elderly believers frequently say how bad (kuiqian)
they are and how they are unworthy (bupei) of God’s love
in public, but the younger generation of believers has inter-
preted this routine practice as a sign of personal pride, as
self-denigration or even self-denunciation during prayers can
serve as a conspicuous display of self-commitment. For
them, this may not be sincere expression of humility but
merely a stereotyped superficial ritual formality. Of course,
no one says that he or she is opposed to piety. Instead, peo-
ple emphasise piety as the basis of personal gifts (enci)
when they see talented individuals who are not actively in-
volved in church, a great pity in their view. In this way they
justify their conservative moral agenda. As I have observed
in many circumstances, however, one’s spiritual piety is not
emphasised in the current context as much as it was under
the harsh repression of the Maoist state.
Those who demonstrate high suzhi and capacity in dealing
with church affairs are actually viewed as having innate and
self-evident spiritual qualities. For example, a recently bap-
tised local entrepreneur who made huge financial contribu-
tions to various church building projects both in and outside
of Wenzhou is said in the local church community to “love
the Lord ardently” (rexin aizhu), and his testimony has cir-
culated widely in local church circles. Apparently, a multifac-
eted notion of Christian suzhi is celebrated in the church.
Piety as an embodied Christian quality, although still quite
meaningful to many of the elder generation of believers — an
increasingly marginalised minority in the urban church — has
been subsumed into an overall Christian suzhi.
Justifying a  soc io re l i gious  hierarchy
The rhetoric used in many local believers’ conversations and
speeches shows that the church’s marginalised subcultural
identity centred on the notion of piety is being replaced by
an elitist form of identity reflecting its more sophisticated,
cosmopolitan pursuits in mainstream urban society. It is
greatly appreciated in the Wenzhou church if one is good at
leading a meeting, making a decision, dealing with state
agencies, resolving a conflict, and giving a public speech.
Wenzhou churchgoers, both young and old, men and
women, speak highly of those Christians who are in posi-
tions of social, political, and economic influence and who
have high suzhi in various forms. As one put it, “The bosses
have better (social) knowledge and a wider scope in the
world, so others like to listen to them.” Some have even en-
gaged in discussions over who is the richest preacher and
who is the biggest Christian entrepreneur in Wenzhou.
Many local believers are enthusiastic admirers of overseas
church brothers who hold high educational and professional
credentials. Consciously using the “celebrity effect” (min-
gren xiaoying), some local churches take pains to seek no-
table overseas guest preachers/speakers in order to exhibit
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the high suzhi of their own belief. These invited successful
Christian professionals are literally put on display in the
church. Here we see how the “prosperity gospel” is appro-
priated, indeed materially “consumed” by locals for the pur-
pose of reinforcing their own cultural superiority. 
The church’s ability to deal with both the secular state and
the market seems to rest on individual leaders’ suzhi. As an
entrepreneur and local church leader once commented, “I
think a church’s revival has a lot to do with its leader. His vi-
sion, capacity for work, and sense of responsibility may de-
termine the stage of church development. If he doesn’t do a
good job, it will truly restrain the development of the
church.” This is a familiar view of an entrepreneur’s role in
enterprise development in Reform Era China. However,
this church leader also immediately adds, “Although our
work cannot depend on the leaders but the Holy Spirit, the
Holy Spirit uses people to do its work.” In the current con-
text of church development and inter-church competition, it
appears that only this entrepreneurial class of believers can
assume leadership roles in the church. Many churchgoers ac-
cept this as the church’s only choice in this particular histor-
ical and social context.
On the other hand, the “low suzhi” of the elder generation
of house church leaders is often a target of ridicule in the
church. As one middle-aged church leader put it when
speaking on the qualifications for a (ideal) church leader
that fits today’s church development, “Their suzhi is very
low, even they cannot take it themselves. Their model
should be reformed . . .Today’s church leaders must have not
only great ardency for work but also gifts, being good at mak-
ing speeches and prayers. If you don’t have any gift, you are
not good at speaking and making prayers, then . . . If your
gift is obvious, oral skills and knowledge are both especially
good, then you can usually do a great job.” It is noteworthy
that I have more than once heard Christian bosses blame
elderly believers for “only knowing how to kneel down to
pray for everything but without taking any action.” However,
the same bosses also greatly emphasise the importance of
prayer from time to time. This contradiction is due to the
fact that the skill of prayer, a key measure of one’s piety or
spiritual quality, is viewed as only part of the overall suzhi
among Wenzhou Protestants. Unfortunately, elderly believ-
ers have tended to overplay their piety and lack other types
of modern suzhi that are highly valued in today’s church. 
Echoing this criticism of old-fashioned elderly house church
members, a disgruntled young preacher and seminary grad-
uate complained at length about the low salary of full-time
Wenzhou preachers and jeered at elderly church leaders’
lack of interest in new things, a sign of their lack of suzhi. (43)
He further justified his complaint by situating it in the devel-
opment of the Wenzhou church and in the broader context
of China’s socioeconomic change. (44) As he said, 
During the Long March, the Red Army ate their
leather belts. But it is impossible for us to eat such
things now. They [elderly church leaders] used to be
the workers of their times but now have become the
obstacle of our times, not willing to give up their po-
sitions. As the economy develops, one cannot make a
fortune simply by being ardent and bold. After 20
years of development, the church is now at the stage
of raising its suzhi. . .
The juxtaposing of economic development with church devel-
opment tells a great deal about the positioning and pursuits of
average middle-class Wenzhou Protestants amidst the rapid
social change. The poor compensation of their full-time
church co-workers is mainly due to the deeply rooted spiri-
tual/secular binary in the local church community. The old
logic is that a bitter and poor life can testify to one’s true faith,
which mirrors the Maoist revolutionary slogan — the poorer
you are, the more glorious you become (yueqiong yueguan-
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43. Another local preacher observes that full-time preachers usually only receive a 600-800
yuan monthly salary from the church. Recently, some churches have made adjustments
and raised preachers’ salaries to 1,000-1,500 yuan. Furthermore, it appears that the
wealthier a region is, the smaller the number of people it sends to seminaries. Two rel-
atively poor counties, Pingyang and Cangnan, sent the largest number of youths to sem-
inaries. 
44. Many local church sisters prefer to marry rich bosses rather than full-time preachers.
Some make clear that they do not even consider full-time preachers. A local preacher
who has had a hard time finding a mate characterises this phenomenon as “Satan’s
attack.” 
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A Chinese American Christian giving a lecture in a local
church on how to combine faith with business.
© Nanlai Cao  
grong). However, it also has much to do with the “low suzhi”
of current full-time preachers. Some church members have no-
ticed that the educational level of the average Wenzhou
Protestant lags behind that of the larger society, and secular
jobs often require stronger educational qualifications than the
position of a preacher in the church. Almost no full-time
church workers in Wenzhou hold college degrees. 
Initiatives have been taken to enhance the wenhua suzhi of
the local church community. Among the many church train-
ing programs in Wenzhou, the Wenzhou Lay Training Cen-
tre provides the most systematic training to help the vast num-
ber of church volunteers serve the church. (45) Established in
1995 by the Wenzhou city-level Three-Self Patriotic Move-
ment/ China Christian Council, the Centre offers short
courses in preaching, hymn and music studies, and church
management. The goal of this rather practical training is to
cultivate a group of volunteer preachers “good at talking and
singing” (huijiang huichang) and to “raise their Bible knowl-
edge and preaching quality” (jiangdao suzhi (46)). Since most
of the volunteers in Wenzhou have other jobs, a regular cor-
respondence course was also set up with the support of the
Nanjing Union Theological Seminary in the same year, and
it soon became popular. Hundreds of church volunteer work-
ers receive training from the Centre each year. 
The institutionalised lay training system has greatly facili-
tated pastoral work in Wenzhou. However, as the local pop-
ulation’s general educational level continually improves,
many young church workers have felt pressured to further en-
hance their cultural quality and preaching skills, and have re-
cently sought educational credentials not only in seminaries
but also in secular higher education institutions. For in-
stance, a significant number of Wenzhou church preachers
have enrolled in part-time religious study graduate programs
at Peking University and the People’s University in Beijing
to pursue Christian studies since 2004. (47) The programs in-
volve about 80 days of classroom instruction during school
breaks over a two-year period. Upon successful completion
of the coursework, the two prestigious Chinese universities
issue graduate coursework completion certificates that en-
able graduates to find better positions in their churches or
move on to degree studies in overseas seminaries. 
Suzhi involves embodied habitus; it is not only a matter of
education, or in this case, of achieving religious literacy, but
also has much to do with individual tastes in cultural con-
sumption and patterns of behaviour. (48) During my fieldwork
in Wenzhou, some local churches invited professional musi-
cians and modern orchestras from other cities and even over-
seas to perform in Wenzhou before and during Christmas as
a means of enhancing and displaying their wenhua suzhi. In
so doing, they seek to justify their conservative faith identity
in an urban commercialised economy. The habitus of these
advantaged urban Protestants distinguishes them from popu-
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45. A great number of overseas pastors and preachers have been involved in the training of
Wenzhou’s lay church leaders through a variety of courses and programs. They mostly
operate secretly, since such connections with the foreign church are technically illegal
in China.
46. Shi Chenghui, “Wenzhou jiaohui shi ruhe kaizhan yigong peixun gongzuo de” (How the
Wenzhou church volunteers’ training work is conducted), Tianfeng. no. 10. 1997, p. 9.
47. The People’s University charges 10,000 yuan for its Christian Thoughts course, and
Peking University 18,000 yuan for its Christian Culture course. 
48. On habitus, see Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, Trans. Richard Nice,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1977.
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A Chinese Australian violinist performing 
in a local church concert.
© Nanlai Cao   
A modern dance drama entitled “The Star of Bethlehem” held in a
local theatre and attended by nearly a thousand Wenzhou
churchgoers. © Nanlai Cao 
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lar religious practitioners in impoverished rural communities,
where amateur local opera troupes are often hired for ritual
events. 
This emphasis on wenhua suzhi relates directly to local en-
trepreneurs‘ acute awareness of their lack of schooling and
nouveau riche status. As a boss Christian who runs a shoe
factory characteristically put it, “In the past you could start
your own business with 10,000 yuan; now even if you have
a million you can hardly do it. Times are different now. In
the past, the shoe-making bosses all had no culture and only
depended on hard work. Now it is impossible without cul-
ture.” The dominance of single individuals or households
over most Wenzhou enterprises gives them clear lines of
command and enormous flexibility. But as they grow, partic-
ularly when export-oriented production increases, they face
the limits of what one person or family can manage. Bosses
who have experienced ups and downs in the business world
often express a deep regret for having not read the Bible ear-
lier, for they now realise that it is all up to God (rensuan
buru tiansuan). However, Christianity provides not just a
sense of certainty or psychological comfort but, more impor-
tantly, a bridge, a universal canonical language, and an es-
sential cultural quality for them to communicate with West-
ern modernity and expand their global business network. 
For successful entrepreneurs and church leaders, religious
practices embody direct transferability between a textually-
based faith, entrepreneurial wealth, and an elite sense of
self-identity. The common assumption is that being Chris-
tian, Western, wealthy, modern, capitalist, and of high so-
cial status should ideally all go together. Projects of self-
making ought to cultivate all these individually-embodied
spiritual and material qualities so that individuals can proj-
ect a self-image that claims all of these desired qualities at
once. The Wenzhou Protestant obsession with self-improve-
ment and the production of self-interested individuals thus
contributes to the formation and justification of a socioreli-
gious hierarchy. 
L imits  to the  embrace o f  suzhi di scourse :The  cl ergy ’s  d ilemma
Many Wenzhou Protestants are striving to move upward in
both the economic and spiritual hierarchies. This is neatly
captured by a local Christian saying, “Bosses all want to
preach, while (full-time) preachers all want to do business.”
Not surprisingly, there are very few full-time preachers in
Wenzhou; most preachers have personal businesses and
serve the church on a part-time basis. For local churchgoers,
capacity in secular business dealing and enterprise manage-
ment is a main indicator of one’s suzhi and is closely related
to one’s role and status in the church. As one young boss has
observed, “Those who have developed a successful business
career are less interested in gaining power in the church.
Only those who have no professional career will seek power
and interests in the church circle to make up for their losses
in the larger society.” 
Similarly, a church sister made the following comments when
speaking of a full-time church preacher who was involved in a
serious corruption scandal by embezzling perhaps hundreds of
thousands of yuan in church funds: “Entrepreneurs (qiyejia)
work for their enterprises, bosses (laoban) work for money,
preachers (chuandaoren) work for making ends meet.” She
added, “The person, having served the church for too long, is
unable to get a good position in society and can only drift
along (hun) in the church, but still receives much respect.” It
seems that entrepreneurs always occupy the highest place in
the social evaluation system of the church, while the full-time
preachers sound more like today’s typical minimum-wage
workers. Preacher-church leader relations sometimes mirror
manager-president relations in a corporate structure. (49) Full-
time preachers must obey the order of the church leaders who
are in charge of full-time co-workers’ employment and com-
pensation, or they will be fired. 
The commonly-held belief regarding full-time preachers in the
church is that those who are unable to test into a four-year col-
lege may end up attending a two-year seminary school for a
devalued diploma. It is common for church brothers and sis-
ters to question a full-time church worker behind his back, say-
ing something like, “If he could make good money in his (sec-
ular) work, would he still serve the church on a full-time
basis?” The assumption is that getting rich should take prior-
ity over commitment to church work. In fact, many suggest
that some full-time church workers attempt to access money,
power, and respect through the church that are otherwise un-
available to them in the larger society. This vividly captures
the disadvantaged status of full-time church workers.
Church leaders are also under pressure to validate the au-
thenticity of their faith by demonstrating high suzhi in deal-
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49. Most Wenzhou churches are controlled by lay people rather than full-time preachers. For
details of the Wenzhou church’s lay-clergy relations and its hierarchical management
structure, see Nanlai Cao, “Boss Christians,” art. cit.
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A specially-designed Wenzhou entrepreneurs’ admission
ticket to an evangelical banquet. Note the Bible verse on
the ticket, which is commonly used by local preachers
to initiate a prayer and is a key medium through which
local believers engage secular modernity.
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ing with the secular world. As a full-time preacher com-
mented on a Christian boss and church leader, “It‘s not that
you have to give up your enterprise to be a full-time church
worker. If he didn‘t run his enterprise, he would not be able
to do good work in the church. With a private enterprise, the
effects (of church work) are much better.” The Christian
boss quit his business for one year and transferred the enter-
prise to his relatives. However, as a rather sensitive person,
he discovered that during that period, some people did not
even greet him, or pretended not to recognise him in church.
“Without money, no one listens to you,“ he says. Some
church co-workers reckon that his growing confidence comes
directly from his recent business success. Such comments un-
derscore a finding that appears throughout this study: church
leaders’ private enterprises give them an advantage in accru-
ing significant influence in the church and facilitating their
church work. However, a church leader may still find him-
self in a dilemma, even if he can demonstrate his business
achievements before the church. In this case, some would
say that “When he was poor, he bowed his head while walk-
ing and no one listened to him; after becoming rich he
stands on the stage and wants people to listen to him.” 
This dilemma shows that many local believers hold contra-
dictory expectations toward the clergy. The contradictory ex-
pectations reflect the conflicting desires among the local
church community that can be characterised by the tension
between a prosperity gospel and a fundamentalist belief in
the spiritual/secular binary. However, the seemingly contra-
dictory categories are often well integrated with recourse to
the suzhi discourse that enables one to claim both economic
and spiritual superiority. Therefore, the Protestant project of
self-making manifests a point of convergence at which dis-
tinctions and inequalities of economic power and social pres-
tige are reinforced and legitimated. In sum, the growing pop-
ularity of the term suzhi among Chinese Protestants in the
Reform Era points to both a change of individual mentality
and a larger organisational change within the church commu-
nity, from the central theme of survival amongst hardship to
that of development in an openly competitive environment. Conclusion:  Chr is t ian suzhiand e l ite  Protestant  re l ig iosi ty
Protestant Christianity has flourished throughout China in
the last few decades of economic reform. It is particularly
popular in local and regional spaces along the coast where
the state established special economic zones in the early
1980s and withdrew from direct intervention in the private
economy and other spheres of life thereafter. In recognition
of Christianity as a source of moral values in the economy,
the state has provided much greater space for the expansion
of Protestant activities and structures than for the staging of
popular religious events and practices, which still bear the
stigma of superstition. Although the upwardly mobile class
of believers discussed in this paper may remain a minority
among the overall Chinese Christian population, it has in-
creasingly assumed leadership positions and discursive
power in the church, and is thus more likely than other
Christian groups to shape the future of Chinese Christianity
and its relationship with the state.
In a 2006 interview with a senior officer (chuzhang) at the
RAB office in the Wenzhou municipal government building,
I was told that Christian entrepreneurs are given official per-
mission and blessing to set up chapels and preach in their
own factories, not only as a gesture of official respect for local
bosses’ personal religious beliefs and entrepreneurial produc-
tivity, but also as an appreciation of Christian moral culture
as an effective means of workforce discipline. This is a telling
example of the convergence of the reformist state’s and pri-
vate entrepreneurs’ neoliberal interests, despite the fact that
preaching or holding religious gatherings outside of state-ap-
proved religious venues is still technically illegal. Apparently,
the state discourse on spiritual civilisation has willingly incor-
porated Christian morals into the spiritual development of so-
ciety as a necessary parallel to national progress in the mate-
rial realm. Against this urban, social, and discursive back-
ground, the notion of raising the quality of belief has emerged
and become central to the discourse of local church develop-
ment. It provides a semiotic space in which different groups
of Chinese Protestants come to engage secular modernity, ar-
ticulate their interconnected, often mutually reinforcing reli-
gious and social ideals, and debate on the perceived right
path for the development of the Chinese church. 
This debate is certainly not confined within the institutional
context of local Protestantism or relevant only to the construc-
tion of local Protestant identity. One sees the pervasiveness of
the Christian suzhi discourse in the official Protestant circle
and in its deep entanglement with the theological reconstruc-
tion movement on the national level. Perhaps the debate on
what really constitutes the ideal Christian suzhi and how it
matters will continue for the time being. Nevertheless, there
appears to be a consensus among various interlocutors in the
church that suzhi is essential to an elite mode of Protestant re-
ligiosity and to sound church governance in twenty-first cen-
tury China. As a local Wenzhou church worker put it in a
rhetorical question, “We carry such a (evangelical) mission. If
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Raising the Quality of Belief
there is no suzhi as a foundation (jichu) for church work in
modern society, how can we accomplish what God has taught
us to do and achieve a substantial leap forward?”
In this article I have highlighted the significance of the suzhi
discourse as conducive to the construction and expression of
a new elite Protestantism in China’s emerging market econ-
omy as well as the politics behind the discourse. The grow-
ing elite Protestant identity has significant implications for
how the church will engage both state and capitalist moder-
nities. However, it is first and foremost a product of the Chi-
nese church’s expanding worldly engagements in the last few
decades, as the Christian suzhi discourse testifies to the in-
creasing assertion of urban middle-class consciousness within
the Chinese Protestant community, rather than in Christian
theology or ideology per se. What is significant and unique
about the Christian suzhi discourse is its tendency to deny
the unbridgeablity of any split between the material and spir-
itual spheres of everyday existence.
As the heavily loaded term of suzhi circulates with increasing
speed both within and beyond the church, one may be
tempted to believe that the place of Protestantism in a rapidly
changing Chinese society will largely hinge on the rise or fall
in the quality of belief. In fact, some Chinese scholars have ar-
gued that the urban church should guide the development of
the rural church because the former surpasses the latter in the
quality of belief. (50) Therefore, can the emergent Christian
suzhi discourse be seen as a case of a religion consciously
adapting itself to the new socioeconomic milieu through secu-
lar legitimation politics, or as just an automatic manifestation
of changing socioeconomic realities in the religious/spiritual
domain? Further research is needed to determine the causal
relationship. Either way, Chinese Protestantism has been fun-
damentally transformed in a reconfigured political economy.
Hence, social-scientific research on contemporary Chinese
Protestantism should shift its focus from the quantitative di-
mension of religious expansion under political repression to
the qualitative aspect of religious development and innovation
under new circumstances, be it cultural, moral, emotional, or
aesthetic. Before attending to the aspirations, rhetoric, and ac-
tions of individual Chinese Protestants and the mechanism of
the post-Mao Protestant revival, one needs to refrain from rou-
tinely assuming the Chinese Protestant experience as a homo-
geneous derivative of Christianisation in the West. 
Western observers (especially the Protestant-minded) often
assume that the post-Mao religious revival reflects a spiri-
tual hunger and yearning among the disillusioned Chinese.
Although this observation may not be completely wrong, it
fails to comprehend the complex nature of contemporary
Chinese religiosities, especially the multiple social and ide-
ological worlds of Chinese Protestantism, by projecting
Western cosmology onto the cultural other. For many
urban-oriented Chinese converting to and practicing Chris-
tianity in the post-Mao era, raising the quality of belief has
become a paramount concern, embodying their elitist de-
sires and pursuits when confronting radical social and eco-
nomic change. Countering the one-dimensional representa-
tion of Christian religiosity, self-enterprising Chinese
Protestants in prosperous coastal areas are currently using
monotheistic religion to seek all desired embodied qualities
as promised by the sacred text and constructing a hybrid
form of socioreligious identity. Indeed, Chinese Protestant
development has undergone not only a quantitative increase
in church membership and religious space, but also a qual-
itative change in social composition, religious positioning,
and cultural outlook. •
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50. Chen Cunfu and Wu Yubo, “Chengshihua guocheng zhong de dangdai nongcun jidujiao,”
art. cit., p. 83.
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Glossary
bipo 逼迫  bupei 不配  chuandao ren 傳道人  chuzhang 處長
diji cusu luohou 低級粗俗落後  enci 恩賜 
gongmin zeren 公民責任  hongyang 弘揚 
huijiang huichang 會講會唱  hun 混
jiangdao suzhi 講道素質  jichu 基礎  kuiqian 虧欠 
laoban 老板  li 禮   mingren xiaoying 名人效應 
pianqian 騙錢  qiye jia 企業家
renkou suzhi 人口素質  rensuan buru tiansuan 人算不如天算
rexin aizhu 熱心愛主  shen de zhongxin puren 神的忠心僕人
shouku 受苦  suzhi 素質  tigao renminde suzhi 提高人民的素質
wei zhu shouku 為主受苦  wenhua suzhi 文化素質 
wenminghu 文明戶  wuhao jiating 五好家庭 
xinyang suzhi 信仰素質  xundao 殉道 
yueqiong yueguangrong 越窮越光榮  zhengti suzhi 整體素質 
zhongxin 忠心  zhong zhong zhi zhong 重中之重
